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OPINION 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Thurman Stanley appeals his sentence and argues that the District Court erred by 
requiring him to comply with the registration requirements of the Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”).  We will affirm. 
I. Background 
Stanley was charged with eleven counts relating to various sex trafficking and 
controlled substance offenses, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1591(a), 1591(b)(1), 
1594(a), 2421 and 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pled guilty to 
four counts related to transporting individuals in interstate commerce to engage in 
prostitution and unlawful possession with intent to distribute controlled substances.  The 
government dismissed the remaining counts.   
The plea agreement contained a provision discussing sex offender registration, as 
follows:   
The defendant understands that the court, as a condition of supervised 
release or probation, must order the defendant to comply with all sex 
                                              
 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
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offender registration requirements under the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act and that, if applicable, defendant must register and keep 
registration current and accurate in each of the following jurisdictions: the 
location of residence; the location of employment; and location of any 
school that defendant is attending. 
 
(App. at 64.)  According to the terms of the agreement, failure to comply with those 
requirements and other obligations could “subject [Stanley] to prosecution under federal 
law.”  (App. at 65.) 
The probation officer prepared a presentence report (“PSR”) before Stanley’s 
sentencing hearing.  Consistent with the plea agreement, the PSR recommended that the 
District Court impose, as a special condition of Stanley’s supervised release, that he 
comply with SORNA’s registration requirements.  Stanley objected to those registration 
requirements in his sentencing memorandum and at his sentencing hearing, arguing that 
his conduct did not meet SORNA’s definition of a “sex offense.”  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 16911(5) (2017)1 (defining “sex offense” for purposes of SORNA).   
The Court ultimately imposed a punishment that, among other things, conditioned 
Stanley’s supervised release on his compliance with SORNA’s registration requirements.  
With respect to that condition, the Court’s order reads, “You must comply with the 
requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (42 U.S.C. § 16901, 
et seq.) as directed by the probation officer, the Bureau of Prisons, or any state sex 
offender registration agency in the location where you reside, work, are a student, or were 
convicted of a qualifying offense.”  (App. at 6.) 
Stanley timely appealed.   
                                              
1  Recodified at 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5). 
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II. Discussion2 
Stanley argues that we must vacate the portion of his sentence requiring him to 
register as a sex offender.  We disagree because he waived his right to challenge 
SORNA’s applicability when he entered into a plea agreement with the government that 
clearly states the necessity of complying with SORNA’s registration requirements. 
Plea agreements are analyzed using contract law principles.  United States v. 
Williams, 510 F.3d 416, 422 (3d Cir. 2007).  We must “strictly construe the text against 
[the government] when it has drafted the agreement,” and thus we resolve any 
ambiguities against the government.  Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).  But 
there is nothing ambiguous here.  Plea agreements have to “work[] both ways,” binding 
the government and the defendant alike to their conditions.  Id. (citation omitted).  We 
have said that “[a defendant] cannot renege on his agreement.”  Id. (citation omitted).  A 
defendant who stipulates to a point in a plea agreement cannot later make arguments 
taking a contrary position.  Id.  When a defendant seeks the benefits of a plea agreement 
without its burdens, we have “no difficulty” saying no.  Id. (citation omitted). 
Here, the plea agreement plainly states that Stanley must comply with SORNA.  
As noted earlier, it says 
[t]he defendant understands that the court, as a condition of supervised 
release or probation, must order the defendant to comply with all sex 
offender registration requirements under the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act and that, if applicable, defendant must register and keep 
registration current and accurate in each of the following jurisdictions: the 
                                              
2  The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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location of residence; the location of employment; and location of any 
school that defendant is attending. 
 
(App. at 64 (emphasis added).)  That sentence contains two distinct and independent 
ideas joined by the conjunction “and.”3  The first part of the sentence mandates that 
Stanley comply with SORNA’s sex offender registration requirements.  The second part 
states that he needs to register or keep his registration current in each jurisdiction where 
he lives and works, “if applicable.”  We interpret that second part to merely indicate that 
Stanley may not have to take any further action if he lives and works in a single location 
during the course of his supervised release.  The “if applicable” language need not and 
should not be imported into the first part of the sentence.  At bottom, Stanley agreed to 
comply with SORNA’s registration requirements, and he cannot now discard the 
obligation he voluntarily accepted. 
III. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the sentence in full. 
                                              
3  The government could make the pertinent sentence in the plea agreement clearer 
still with a period, rather than an “and.” 
